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Unlike what Hobbesian theories argue, the provision of governance is not necessarily undermined by a 
lack of statehood. Empirical findings show that – contrary to many voices in current debates on weak, 
failing, or failed states – various (non-state) actors provide governance even when statehood is limited. 
This paper addresses the puzzle of how to account for cases where governance exists although the state 
cannot or does not provide it. Transferring insights from political sociology to the analysis of such “gov-
ernance without the state,” the paper holds that the way societies manage their affairs critically depends 
on social conditions, which are captured here following social capital theory. Working toward a political 
sociology of “governance without a state,” this paper links social capital, resulting in interpersonal trust, to 
social coordination underlying the provision of governance. In this context, governance is interpreted as 
a collective action game (“governance game”), in which socially embedded (collective) actors are seen as 
players whose behavior (in particular their decisions to cooperate) depends critically on their social capital 
endowments. The main argument is that specific types of social capital endowments facilitate – and, thus, 
explain – specific modes of social coordination in areas of limited statehood. Explorative in nature, con-
ceptual and theoretical arguments will be developed that offer new perspectives to explain the variance and 
mechanisms of governance outside the OECD world.
Zusammenfassung:
Im Gegensatz zu Hobb’schen Argumentationen ist die Bereitstellung von Governance nicht notwendi-
gerweise an starke Staatlichkeit gebunden: Empirische Belege zeigen, dass verschiedene (nicht-staatliche) 
Akteure Governance-Leistungen trotz zumindest begrenzter Staatlichkeit bereitstellen – entgegen vieler 
Stimmen in zeitgenössischen Diskursen zu schwacher und gescheiterter Staatlichkeit. Der Aufsatz geht 
der Frage nach, wie die Fälle erklärt werden können, wo Governance erfolgreich bereitgestellt wird obwohl 
der Staat entweder keine Governance-Leistungen erbringt oder erbringen kann. Im Rahmen des Transfers 
von Forschungsergebnissen der Politischen Soziologie in die Analyse von „Governance ohne Staat“ geht 
der Aufsatz von der Annahme aus, dass Art und Weise wie Gesellschaften sich organisieren maßgeblich 
von deren sozialstruktureller Bedingtheit abhängen. Diese spezifiziert der Aufsatz mithilfe des Sozialkapi-
taltheorie. Auf dem Weg zu einer Politischen Soziologie der „Governance ohne Staat“, stellt der Aufsatz 
die Beziehung zwischen Sozialkapital, vor allem in seiner Ausprägung als interpersonelles Vertrauen, und 
sozialer Handlungskoordination als Grundlage von Governance her. In diesem Kontext wird die Bereit-
stellung von Governance als Spiel kollektiven Handelns verstanden („Governance Game“), in dem das 
Verhalten sozial-eingebetteter (kollektiver) Akteure (und insbesondere ihre Kooperationsentscheidungen) 
maßgeblich von dem Umfang ihres Sozialkapitals abhängen. Das zentrale Argument des Aufsatzes ist, 
dass spezifische Typen von Sozialkapital bestimmte Modi der sozialen Handlungskoordination in Räumen 
begrenzter Staatlichkeit ermöglichen und entsprechend erklären. Im Rahmen eines explorativen Zugangs 
werden konzeptuelle und theoretische Begründungen vorgebracht, die bei der Erklärung der Varianz und 
der Prozesse von Governance außerhalb der OECD-Welt neue Perspektiven eröffnen.
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1. Introduction
„Communities	that	have	been	cut	off	from	an	effective	state	authority	–	whether	









„in	 which	 central	 authorities	 (governments)	 lack	 the	 ability	 to	 implement	 and	
enforce	rules	and	decisions	or	in	which	the	legitimate	monopoly	over	the	means	
of	violence	 is	 lacking,	or	both,	at	 least	 temporarily.	The	ability	 to	enforce	rules	
or	to	control	 the	means	of	violence	can	be	restricted	along	various	dimensions:	
territorially;	sectorally	(i.e.	with	regard	to	specific	policy	areas);	socially	(i.e.	with	






have	 become	 the	 conceptual	 blueprint	 for	 statehood	 around	 the	 globe	 (Brinkerhoff	 2005;	
Fukuyama	2005).	The	goal	is	to	build	stable	and	democratic	states	(Grimm	and	Merkel	2009;	
Ottaway	2002),	 especially	 in	post-conflict	 contexts	 (Paris	 and	Sisk	2009,	 2ff).	Many	 share	 the	















work	has	adapted	 the	concept	of	governance,	 specified	as	“institutionalized	modes	of	 social	
coordination	 to	 produce	 and	 implement	 collectively	 binding	 rules,	 or	 to	 provide	 collective	
goods”	(see	e.g.	Mayntz	2009	and	Risse	2010,	8).	This	approach	provides	an	alternative	to	state-






The	 observed	 forms	 of	 governance	without	 the	 state	 stand	 in	 opposition	 to	 the	Hobbesian	
argument,	which	 is	 broadly	 echoed	 in	 current	 debates	 on	weak,	 failing,	 or	 failed	 states;	 the	
absence	 of	 the	 state’s	 monopoly	 on	 violence	 does	 not	 necessarily	 imply	 an	 uncooperative	











political	 sociology	 has	 often	 conceptualized	 these	 conditions	 as	 “social	 capital,”	 comprised	
of	norms,	interpersonal	trust,	and	networks	(for	an	overview,	see	Field	2003).	The	concept	of	
social	capital	has	been	linked	to	various	social	phenomena,	ranging	from	the	functioning	of	




According	 to	Elinor	Ostrom	and	T.	K.	Ahn,	 social	 capital	“helps	 to	 synthesize	how	cultural,	
social,	 and	 institutional	 aspects	 of	 communities	 jointly	 affect	 their	 capacity	 to	 deal	 with	
collective-action	 problems”	 (Ostrom	 and	Ahn	 2003,	 xvi).	While	 political	 sociology	 has	 often	
analyzed	governance	by	the	state,	the	discipline	has	rarely	been	applied	to	non-Western	forms	
of	governance	outside	the	OECD	context.
SFB-Governance Working Paper Series • No. 60 • September 2013  |  7
This	 working	 paper	 strives	 to	 transfer	 insights	 from	 political	 sociology	 to	 the	 analysis	 of	
governance	 without	 the	 state.	 It	 addresses	 the	 question	 of	 whether	 different	 types	 and	




























This	 working	 paper	 argues	 that	 social	 capital	 enables	 actors	 to	 overcome	 collective	 action	
problems	and	 subsequently	 to	 coordinate	 their	behavior	 in	 the	 absence	of	 statehood	as	 the	
“Leviathan.”	In	particular,	it	will	be	argued	that	high	levels	of	interpersonal	trust	–	the	outcome	
of	high	aggregated	levels	of	social	capital	(Ahn	and	Ostrom	2008;	2003)	–	change	the	way	that	
























Chapter Two will	 delineate	 how	hierarchical	 and	 non-hierarchical	 coordination	 in	 areas	 of	
limited	statehood	are	enabled	by	particular	social	capital	endowments,	and	it	will	 formulate	
corresponding	 propositions.	 Specifically,	 I	 will	 argue	 that	 social	 capital	 can	 increase	 the	
legitimacy	 of	 hierarchical	 coordination.	 Furthermore,	 “bridging”	 social	 capital	 (Woolcock	
2001,	 12-13)	 facilitates	 horizontal	 coordination	 by	 increasing	 the	 trustworthiness	 of	 actors,	
which	reduces	collective	action	problems	underlying	the	provision	of	governance	without	the	
hierarchical	enforcement	of	contracts	and	rules.
The	 last	 section	of	 the	 chapter	examines	 the	 role	of	 trust	networks	 for	governance	 in	areas	
of	 limited	statehood.	This	section	also	attempts	 to	shed	 light	on	 the	possible	“dark	side”	of	
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2. Setting the Stage
2.1 Political Sociology and Limited Statehood
Political	sociology	addresses	the	relationship	between	political	institutions	and	their	underlying	
























that	 claim	 that,	“class,	 geography,	 climate,	 ethnicity,	 language,	 culture,	 economic	 conditions,	
demography,	 technology,	 ideology,	 and	 religion	 all	 affect	 politics	 but	 are	 not	 significantly	
affected	by	politics”	(March	and	Olsen	1984,	735).	Others	are	rather	“reductionist,”	focusing	on	
micro-level	social	interactions	to	explain	macro	phenomena	(cp.	March	and	Olsen	1984,	735f.),	
or	“institutionalist,”	 stressing	 the	 idea	 that	 institutions	 shape	micro-level	 interactions.	This	





all	 of	 which	 are	 seen	 as	 essential	 for	 the	 functioning	 of	 democratic	 institutions	 (Caparini	


































„Through	 investment	 in	 building	 their	 network	 of	 external	 relations,	 both	
individual	and	collective	actors	can	augment	their	social	capital	and	thereby	gain	






















Does Social Capital Support Democracy?
During	its	heyday	following	Putnam	et	al.’s	study	in	1993,	social	capital	was	sweepingly	interpreted	




























Is There Only One Type of Social Capital?
In	the	social	capital	literature,	a	distinction	is	made	between	bonding,	bridging,	and linking	social	
capital	(see	Field	2003;	Woolcock	and	Narayan	2000).	Bonding	types	refer	to	social	capital	within	
socially	 confined	 groups	 and	 networks	 that	 maintain	 strong,	 in-group	 loyalty	 while	 often	
reinforcing	 specific	 (exclusive)	 identities.	 It	 has	 been	 associated	 with	 Granovetter’s	 concept	


















Social Capital and Governance: Source or Outcome? 
The	 transfer	 of	 social	 capital	 theory	 to	 areas	 of	 limited	 statehood	 faces	 the	 problem	 of	
endogeneity:	 If	 social	capital	 is	 the	outcome	of	effective	governance	provision	 (including	an	
environment	 for	peaceful	 social	 interactions),	 social	capital	cannot	be	used	as	an	explaining	
variable	for	governance	(cp.	on	this	problem	Börzel	2007,	55).	A	lot	of	thought	has	already	been	









Meanwhile,	 other	 theorists	 have	 stressed	 that	 social	 capital	 depends	 on	 its	 institutional	
framework	and	should	therefore	be	treated	as	an	endogenous	variable	(Freitag	2006;	Jackman	
and	Miller	 2004;	 Letki	 2006;	Newton	 2006;	 Radnitz,	Wheatley,	 and	Zürcher	 2009;	 Rothstein	
and	Stolle	2008,	34).	In	this	somewhat	Hobbesian	view,	political	institutions	in	place	are	seen	
as	a	sine qua non	for	social	interaction,	which	then	generates	social	capital	endowments:	only	




Adapting	 Ostrom	 and	 Ahn’s	 concept	 of	 social	 capital	 as	 consisting	 of	 three	 dimensions	 –	
trustworthiness,	 social	networks,	 and	 institutions	 (Ahn	and	Ostrom	2008;	2003)	–	 this	paper	
positions	itself	on	the	middle	ground	between	the	“culturalists”	and	“institutionalists.”	Social	
capital	and	 institutions	are	seen	as	partially	 interdependent	 (regarding	 the	 interdependence	
between	 democratic	 institutions	 and	 social	 capital,	 see	 Paxton	 2002).	 My	 point	 of	 view	 is	
somewhat	 similar	 to	Granovetter’s	 work	 on	 the	 reciprocal	 relationship	 between	 small-scale	
interactions	 and	 large-scale	 social	 patterns	 (Granovetter	 1973).	 Although	 the	 provision	 of	
governance	facilitated	by	social	capital	certainly	entails	various	feedback	loops,	social	capital	






What Has Not Been Done?
Social	capital	theory	has	previously	been	applied	to	social	processes	outside	the	OECD	context.	
Some	authors	have	drawn	a	connection	between	social	capital,	as	a	dimension	of	the	broader	
concept	 of	 social	 cohesion,	 and	 violent	 conflict	 (see	 Brinkerhoff	 and	 Brinkerhoff	 2002,	 518;	
Colletta	and	Cullen	2000,	12ff.).	Brinkerhoff	and	Mayfield,	for	example,	argue	that	social	capital	
has	played	an	important	role	in	post-war	state	building	in	Iraq	(2005).	Interpersonal	trust	as	
an	 outcome	of	 social	 capital	 has	 been	 linked	 to	 interethnic	 cooperation	 (Fearon	 and	Laitin	














state	 actors,	 for	 instance	 in	 the	 field	 of	 security	 (cp.	 Baker	 2002).	 The	 following	 examples	
further	illustrate	some	of	the	empirical	findings	for	governance	in	the	absence	of	statehood.	
Governance	structures	include	
„state	 actors	 such	 as	 higher	 and	 lower	 echelon	 bureaucrats,	 political	 parties,	
customary	 authorities,	 professional	 associations,	 trade	 unions,	 neighbourhood	
and	 self-help	 organizations,	 social	 movements,	 national	 and	 international	
NGOs,	 churches	 and	 religious	 movements,	 but	 also	 guerillas,	 warlords,	 ‚big	



























state	 institutions	 are	 bystanders	 rather	 than	 part	 of	 the	 governance	 solutions.	 Functions	
commonly	 associated	with	 the	OECD-style	 state	 are	 provided	 by	 various	 actors	 engaged	 in	
various	processes	of	coordination.	In	order	to	analytically	capture	who	(structure)	is	involved	
in	such	“functional	equivalents”	(Draude	2007)	and	how	(through	what	processes),	some	(e.g.,	
Sonderforschungsbereich	 700	 2005)	 have	 adapted	 the	 concept	 of	 “governance”	 from	 largely	
OECD-centered	 research	on	network-like	 forms	of	 coordination	 (Powell	 1990;	Scharpf	 1993)	
and	international	relations	theory	(Rosenau	and	Czempiel	1992).	In	this	context,	governance	(in	
areas	of	limited	statehood)	has	been	defined	as	institutionalized	modes	of	social	coordination	
to	produce	and	 implement	collectively	binding	rules,	or	 to	provide	collective	goods	 (see	e.g.	
Mayntz,	2009;	Risse,	2010).
Despite	rather	isolated	attempts	to	use	social	capital	to	explain	various	social	phenomena	out-
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and	future	to	facilitate	overcoming	social	dilemmas”	(Ahn	and	Ostrom	2008,	73).	The	concept	




has	 long	 been	 associated	 with	 facilitating	market	 transactions	 and	 social	 interactions	 of	 all	
kinds	 (see	 e.g.	Braithwaite	 and	Levi	 1998;	 Fukuyama	 1996;	Gambetta	 1988;	Kramer	 and	Tyler	
1996;	Misztal	1996).	On	the	most	general	level,	trust	is	“a	solution	for	specific	problems	of	risk”	
(Luhmann	2000,	94).	Risk	undermines	cooperation	in	general	and	coordination	in	particular.	
In	 restraining	 actors	 from	 abandoning	 cooperation	 because	 of	 a	 lack	 of	 trust,	 social	 capital	













So-called	 “trust	 games”	 (cp.	 Ahn	 and	 Ostrom	 2008,	 81)	 are	 similarly	 good	 examples.	 These	
are	 game	 theoretical	 situations	 in	which	 one	 actor	 first	 decides	 about	 an	 investment,	 while	

















Trustworthiness	 is	 thus	 linked	 to	 the	 “logic	 of	 consequence”	 as	 well	 as	 to	 the	 “logic	 of	








Social	networks	 increase	 interpersonal	 trust	by	providing	 information	 (cp.	Granovetter	1973)	
about	an	actor’s	past	behavior,	especially	about	past	opportunism	(see	also	Milgrom,	North,	and	
Weingast	1990).	Since	social	networks	consist	of	repetitive	social	interactions,	they	also	change	






are	 important	 factors	 of	 coordination.	Coleman	gives	 an	 example	 of	 the	network–collective	
action	mechanism	 in	 reference	 to	 the	 behavior	 of	 buyers	 and	 sellers	 in	 London’s	 diamond	
district	(which	he	adopts	from	Wechsberg):	
„Men	walk	 around	Hatton	Garden	with	 a	 hundred	 thousand	 pounds	worth	 of	
diamonds	that	were	handed	over	to	them	in	trust.	In	a	dingy	office	a	man	shows	
another	man	a	number	of	stones	that	cost	him	a	fortune,	and	then	goes	away	while	
the	 buyer	 inspects	 them	 carefully.	 No	 contracts	 are	 made.	 Nothing	 is	 written	
down.	All	deals	are	settled	verbally”	(Wechsberg	1966,	p.	83).	The	high	level	of	trust	
manifested	here	stems	from	the	fact	that	“the	reputation	for	trustworthiness	is	of	
central	 importance	 ...	 because	 that	 reputation	 is	 quickly	 communicated	 among	
all	 those	 on	 whom	 the	 trustee	 depends	 for	 future	 business,	 that	 is,	 for	 future	
placement	of	trust“	(Coleman	1990,	109;	see	also	Jackman	and	Miller	1998,	53).
Here,	 the	 social	network	 (as	 a	dimension	of	 social	 capital)	 effectively	 transmits	 information	
about	 actors’	 behavior	 (i.e.,	 reputation)	within	 the	group	of	businessmen	and	 thus	 supports	
trustworthiness;	this,	in	turn,	ensures	that	agreements	are	kept,	since	defection	would	cost	the	
dealers	a	fortune.
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Formal and Informal Institutions
Following	North,	 institutions	 regulate	 social	 behavior	 (1990).	 In	doing	 so,	 they	 largely	 affect	
interpersonal	 trust	–	 especially	 as	 formal	 institutions,	often	within	 legal	 systems	 (cp.	Stoker	







under	 formal	 institutions,	 for	 example	 informal	 institutions,	 international	 standards,	 and	












have	been	observed	empirically	on	 the	aggregate	 level	but	not	necessarily	on	 the	 individual	
level	(see	e.g.	the	analysis	of	social	capital	and	democracy	by	Newton	2006).	Social	capital	should	
rather	be	seen	as	a	condition	that	increases	but	does	not	determine	causally	collective	action.











rules,	 or	 to	 provide	 collective	 goods	 (see	 e.g.	Mayntz	 2009;	 Risse	 2010).	 Social	 coordination	











decisions	 is	 not	 circumscribed)	 as	 well	 as	 horizontally	 (e.g.,	 in	 the	 form	 of	 public-private-
partnerships).	Hierarchical	coordination,	can	also	be	found	on	different	sub-state	levels	(e.g.,	


















fully	played	collective	action	games,	 in	which	different	 (collective)	actors	need	 to	coordinate	
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Actors in the Governance Game
The	collective	action	theory	has	traditionally	conceptualized	actors	as	purely	utility-maximizing	
in	the	narrow	sense	–	as	“rational”	(e.g.,	Hardin	1968;	Olson	1965a,	1965b).	The	“core	of	the	first-
generation	 theories	 of	 collective	 action	 is	 an	 image	 of	 atomized,	 selfish,	 and	 fully	 rational	
individuals”	according	to	Ostrom	and	Ahn	(2003,	xv).	Corresponding	“first-generation”	research	
often	argues	that	collective	action	is	not	 likely	 to	occur,	even	though	its	outcome	may	be	 in	









generation	 collective-action	 theories”	 (see	 Ostrom	 and	 Ahn	 2003,	 xivf.)	 enable	 research	



















in	 a	 deterministic	 sense.	 Institutionalized	 rules,	 even	 if	 they	 are	 completely	
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effective,	 will	 rarely	 prescribe	 one	 and	 only	 one	 course	 of	 action.	 Instead,	 by	
































„[S]trong	trust	implies	the	expectation that alter	[the	other]	will avoid strategy options 
attractive to itself that would seriously hurt ego’s interests	and	that	in	case	of	need	help	
can	be	counted	on	even	if	 it	entails	considerable	cost	 to	the	helper.	 In	terms	of	
the	 mixed-motive	 games	 discussed	 earlier,	 the	 implication	 is	 that	 exploitative	
strategies	will	not	be	used,	and	hence	need	not	be	guarded	against,	in	the	Prisoner’s	




























social	 cooperation	 and	 profitable	 exchange”	 (Scharpf	 1993,	 149;	 see	 also	 Luhmann	 2000).	As	
Scharpf	infers,	“there	is	thus	a	huge	premium	on	the	capacity	for	trustworthy	communications	
and	commitments	among	interdependent	actors.”	He	adds	elsewhere	that	“the	successful	joint	
search	 for	 better	 overall	 solutions	 requires	 creativity,	 effective	 communication,	 and	mutual	
trust”	(Scharpf	1997,	124;	cp.	also	Risse	2000,	21)	.
The	general	 aim	of	 this	 chapter	was	 to	 further	 the	understanding	of	how	 social	 conditions	
affect	 the	 capacity	 of	 different	 (collective)	 actors	 to	 successfully	 play	 the	 governance	 game.	





















have	 often	 conceptually	 grasped	 them	 as	 “hierarchies,”	 “markets,”	 and	 “networks”	 (see	 e.g.	
Powell	 1990),	 much	 of	 the	 governance	 literature	 simply	 conceptualizes	 them	 in	 a	 binary	
way	 as	 “hierarchical”	 and	 “non-hierarchical/horizontal”	 (the	 latter	 containing	 both	markets	
and	 networks).	 Charles	Tilly	 has	 introduced	 another	 terminology	 that	 is	 particularly	 useful	
for	the	analysis	of	governance	without	the	state	and	will	also	be	referred	to	in	the	following	
sections:	“Humans	have	repeatedly	devised	three	different	ways	of	creating	collective	benefits:	




„means	 relations	 among	 social	 sites	 (persons,	 groups,	 structures,	 or	 positions)	
that	promote	their	 taking	account	of	each	other.	Shared	language,	 for	 instance,	
powerfully	 links	 social	 sites	 without	 any	 necessary	 deployment	 of	 coercion	 or	
capital.	Commitment’s	local	organization	varies	as	dramatically	as	do	structures	
of	 coercion	 and	 capital.	Commitments	 can	 take	 the	 form	of	 shared	 religion	or	
ethnicity,	 trading	 ties,	 work-generated	 solidarities,	 communities	 of	 taste,	 and	
much	more.	To	 the	extent	 that	 commitments	of	 these	 sorts	 connect	 rulers	 and	
ruled,	they	substitute	partially	for	coercion	and	capital“	(2004,	31).
Institutionalized	 modes	 of	 social	 coordination	 are	 independent	 of	 the	 state/non-state	
dichotomy	 often	 used	 in	 the	 governance	 literature	 (cp.	 Boege,	 Brown,	 and	 Clements	 2009;	
Draude	2007;	Risse	and	Lehmkuhl	2007,	26f.).	Using	these	“modes”	makes	it	possible	to	analyze	














mens	 ambition,	 avarice,	 anger,	 and	 other	 Passions,	 without	 the	 feare	 of	 some	
coercive	power“	(Hobbes	1651	[1986],	196).
States	 depend	 on	 hierarchies,	 but	 hierarchies	 do	 not	 depend	 on	 states.	 Areas	 of	 limited	
statehood	 are	not	 void	 of	 hierarchical	 coordination.	This	 includes	“shadows	 of	 hierarchical	
authority”	 (Scharpf	1993,	13;	cp.	Börzel	and	Risse	2010),	as	capable	as	hierarchies	of	changing	
actors’	preferences.	While	 the	 lack	of	domestic	 sovereignty	prohibits	 state	 institutions	 from	
hierarchically	 coordinating	 the	 provision	 of	 governance,	 “authoritative	 organizational	
principles”	(Tilly)	can	be	found	on	various	levels.	They	are	involved	in	the	provision	of	non-state	
governance,	 ranging	 from	hierarchical	 coordination	exercised	by	actors	 above	 the	 state	 (e.g.,	
international	protectorates	 in	Kosovo,	Afghanistan,	 and	 Iraq)	 to	 sub-state	governance	actors.	
The	former	are	functional	equivalents	of	states	in	that	they	include	many	state	functions	such	
as	 law	enforcement,	delivery	of	services,	and	coordination	of	 foreign	aid	 (cp.	e.g.	Reno	2008,	
143).	Tilly	names	“warlords,	landlords,	lineage	heads,	ethnic	leaders,	or	religious	magnates”	as	
hierarchical/authoritative	examples	on	the	sub-state	level	(2004,	35),	which	can	be	found	in	areas	
of	 limited	 statehood	as	well.	 Furthermore,	hierarchical	 coordination	can	occur	within	most	

















of	governance	 (regarding	 the	 requirements	of	 intentionality,	 see	Risse	and	Lehmkuhl	2007).	
However,	these	cases	raise	the	fundamental	question	of	which	features	ultimately	distinguish	









This	 section	 argues	 that	 even	 though	 hierarchical	 coordination	 is	 a	 functional	 solution	 to	
collective	 action	 dilemmas	 in	 the	 Hobbesian	 perspective,	 it	 often	 requires	 a	 minimum	 of	
voluntary	cooperation.	This	cooperation,	as	it	will	be	argued,	is	linked	to	certain	social	capital	
endowments.	Hierarchical	coordination	can,	 in	a	Hobbesian	way,	be	 interpreted	as	a	 lack	of	
self-regulation:	“where	 there	 is	 not	 sufficient	 social	 capital	 for	 such	decentralized	 collective	











effective	policing	 to	 legitimacy	and	 trustworthiness	 (for	a	brief	overview,	 see	Hawdon	2008),	
which	points	in	the	same	direction.	
Social Capital Literature
A	great	deal	of	 the	 social	 capital	 literature	has	already	been	devoted	 to	 trustful	 relationships	
between	 citizens	 and	power	holders	 and/or	political	 institutions.	A	 lot	 of	 the	 corresponding	
















Why Can’t Hierarchy Renounce Non-coercive Cooperation?
Max	Weber	already	argued	that	coercive	means	alone	are	not	sufficient	to	sustain	legal	order:	










The	 following	 quotation	 from	Scharpf	 can	 be	 seen	 as	 another	 example	 of	 the	necessity	 for	
cooperation:	“Hierarchical	coordinators	…	must	be	able	to	base	their	decisions	on	information	
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organization’s	boundaries	…	and	sometimes	cross	these	boundaries”	(ibid.,	86).	Thus,	effective	
and	efficient	organizations	have	to	acknowledge	“that	it	is	ultimately	the	informal	norms	and	






Formal and Informal Institutions
In	the	context	of	hierarchical	coordination,	formal	and	informal	institutions	–	as	a	dimension	
of	linking	social	capital	–	matter	most	if	they	include	hierarchical	structures	(e.g.,	organizations),	
for	 they	 are	 linked	 to	 actors’	 perceptions	 of	 legitimacy	 of	 hierarchies.	 Cooperation	 within	
hierarchies	 depends	 on	 legitimacy,	 a	 norm	 that	 determines	 whose	 preferences	 are	 to	 be	
followed.	Legal	 systems	enable	 social	 coordination	as	well	by	 regulating	behavior	 (cp.	 Jamal	
2007,	 130).	 According	 to	 Ian	Hurd,	 there	 are	 three	 “generic	 reasons”	 explaining	 why	 actors	
comply	within	hierarchies:	“(1)	 because	 the	 actor	 fears	 the	punishment	of	 rule	 enforcers,	 (2)	






1999,	 387).	 These	 norms	 are	 (discursively)	 maintained	 within	 certain	 social	 structures	 (e.g.,	
religious	communities)	that	can	be	captured	by	the	social	capital	approach.	However,	linking	
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into	 the	whims	 of	 the	 governing	 power,	 those	 associations	most	 benevolent	 in	
form	and	purpose	became	hierarchically	structured,	clientelistic	sites.	Pro-PNA	











„Authoritarian	 states	 have	 limited	 vertical	 linkages	 (primarily	 downward	 for	





bridging	social	capital,	 the	absence	of	social	networks	across	groups	can	 lead	 to	



























power	differentials,	 is	 important	 for	hierarchical	coordination	in	areas	of	 limited	statehood.	
The	main	argument	is	that	hierarchical	coordination	to	provide	governance	relies	to	a	certain	
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institutions	are	often	limited	because	of	a	lack	of	legitimacy	and	cooperation.	This	situation	







capital	endowments,	 including	 institutions	 that	support	hierarchical	 steering,	networks	 that	







the	 argument	 in	mind:	 empirical	 analyses	 of	 legitimacy	 and	 effectiveness	 in	 the	 context	 of	
hierarchical	coordination	should	not	be	confused	with	 international	 standards	and	 theories	
of	democratic	legitimacy.	This	section	has	provided	a	way	to	empirically	analyze	under	which	
social	conditions	hierarchical	coordination	works,	and	when	it	 is	seen	as	 legitimate	by	 local	
standards.	This	does	not	mean	that	the	outcomes	are	necessarily	desirable	from	a	normative	
perspective.	






Collaborative/non-hierarchical	 institutions	 rely	 on	 horizontal	 modes	 of	 coordination.	 In	






nongovernmental	 organizations	 (NGOs),	 clan	 elders,	 and	 businesspeople	 have	 successfully	
created	municipalities	as	part	of	sub-state	governance	(Menkhaus	2007,	86).	Common	pooled	
resources	(CPRs)	are	another	example	of	collaborative	institutions	and	business	networks,	for	
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example	networks	of	cross-border	 traders	 (Raeymaekers	2010).	CPRs	horizontally	coordinate	
behavior	for	the	sake	of	providing	collective	goods	(Ostrom	1990,	211).
This	 section	 will	 outline	 how	 bridging	 social	 capital	 endowments	 enable	 effective	 social	
coordination	without	the	state.	Horizontal	coordination	depends	on	actors’	ability	to	coordinate	
their	behavior	without	resorting	to	hierarchical	solutions	(as	discussed	previously).	The	absence	
of	 hierarchical	 coordination	 in	 the	 form	 of	 state	 institutions	 enforcing	 binding	 rules	 and	
decisions	makes	 studying	horizontal	 coordination	 in	areas	of	 limited	statehood	particularly	
puzzling.	For	instance,	actors	cannot	build	their	cooperation	upon	legal	systems.
Governance	 entails	 institutionalized	modes	 of	 coordination	with	 the	 outcome	of	 providing	
binding	rules	and	public	goods.	The	underlying	problem	of	coordination	is	illustrated	in	Figure	
2	(adapted	from	Scharpf	1993,	128).	This	simple	model	pinpoints	the	coordination	problem	by	
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In	the	absence	of	hierarchical	coordination,	however,	the	actors	x	and	y	face	the	problem	of	how	
to	horizontally	coordinate	their	behavior.	When	negotiating,	x	will	prefer	B	while	y	will	prefer	
C.	Thus,	 as	 Scharpf	 argues,	“the	 aggregated	welfare	maximum	 that	 can	 be	 achieved	 through	
negotiated	coordination	will	usually	be	lower	than	the	maximum	achievable	through	hierarchical	
coordination.”	 (Scharpf	1993,	 129).	When	actors	negotiate,	 they	also	 face	various	problems,	 for	
example	related	to	transaction	costs	and	the	risks	of	free	riding.	Generally	speaking,	horizontal	
coordination	is	a	collective	action	dilemma.	Both	actors	could	negotiate	to	realize	D.	However,	
this	would	 imply	 that	 y	 splits	 the	 outcome	with	 x.	X,	 however,	would	presumably	 anticipate	















the	collective	action	dilemma.	 Imperfect	knowledge	and	 the	resulting	uncertainty	 leads	 two	






If	 the	 truster	does	not	 trust	 in	 the	first	place,	however,	 the	status	quo	remains	 intact	 (0,0)	–	
for	 example,	 the	 lack	 of	 security	 in	 areas	 of	 limited	 statehood.	 If	 the	 truster	 trusts	 but	 the	




“virtually	 every	 commercial	 transaction	 has	 within	 itself	 an	 element	 of	 trust,	 certainly	 any	
transaction	conducted	over	a	period	of	time”	(Arrow	1972,	356-7,	345).	Arrow	sees	trust	as	one	of	
the	important	“virtues”	underlying	economic	life.
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In	 areas	 of	 limited	 statehood,	 the	 risk	 of	 anarchy	 and	 the	 shadow	 of	 hierarchy	“from	 afar”	
motivate	 actors,	 following	 a	 logic	 of	 consequence,	 to	 contribute	 to	 governance	 (Börzel	 and	






of	 governance.	 Schneckener	 and	Zürcher	 exemplify	 this	 claim	by	writing	 that	 transnational	
































Interpersonal	 trust	 is	a	 function	of	 the	 trustor’s	belief	 in	 the	 trustworthiness	of	 the	 trustee.	
The	trustor’s	heuristics	are	mainly	based	on	 information	about	 the	 trustee	and	the	 trustee’s	
preferences.	Information	about	the	trustee’s	past	interactions	is	crucial,	for	reputation	is	one	
of	 the	main	 sources	 of	 trust.	As	 experimental	 research	 on	 iterative	 forms	 of	 the	 Prisoner’s	
Dilemma	shows	(Ostrom	and	Ahn	2003,	xvii),	trustees	have	incentives	to	reciprocate	as	long	as	
interactions	are	repetitive.	If	they	do	not	reciprocate,	they	risk	positive	outcomes	from	future	
interactions.	At	 the	 same	 time,	 information	 on	 the	 trustee’s	 incentive	 structures	 is	 of	 great	
value	 for	 the	subjective	assessment	of	 trustworthiness.	Legal	systems	and	their	enforcement	
play	an	important	role	in	this	context.	Expected	punishment	for	defection	affects	the	incentives	
structure	of	the	trustee	known	to	the	trustor.
The	trustee’s	 trustworthiness,	however,	 is	not	only	a	 function	of	his/her	 incentives	structure	
but	also	of	what	s/he	regards	as	“appropriate”	behavior.	Social	norms	contained	in	social	capital	
affect	 trustworthiness	beyond	 the	pure	utility-maximizing	behavior	 sketched	above.	 Socially	
shared	norms	of	reciprocity	have	an	impact	on	the	average	trustworthiness	of	communities.	








Following	 the	 arguments	 presented	 here,	 “traditional”	 normative	 structures	 should	 at	 last	
partially	 account	 for	 cooperative	 behavior	 by	 actors	 in	 areas	 of	 limited	 statehood.	 Studying	
norms	 shared	 by	 communities	 in	 areas	 of	 limited	 statehood	 should	 help	 future	 research	
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actors’	 reputations.	 Moreover,	 networks	 include	 repetitive	 interactions,	 which	 “provides	
incentives	to	 individuals	to	build	a	reputation	of	being	trustworthy”	 (Ostrom	and	Ahn	2003,	





















































Areas	 of	 limited	 statehood	 are	 not	 void	 of	 institutions.	 Moreover,	 actors	 find	 themselves	
in	 situations	 of	 “legal	 pluralism”	 (see	 e.g.	 Kötter	 and	 Schuppert	 2009),	 where	 a	 variety	 of	
institutions	make	 up	 the	 rules	 of	 the	 game.	When	 looking	 at	 how	 social	 capital	 facilitates	
horizontal	 cooperation,	 formal	and	 informal	 institutions	are	 relevant	 that	 are	 related	 to	 the	
social	 structures	 in	which	 actors	operate	 and	buildt	 their	 social	 capital.	 Formal	 institutions	
such	as	the	right	to	assembly	and	the	right	to	private	communication	bolster	social	interactions	
that	lead	to	higher	levels	of	social	capital.	Parboteeah	et	al.	confirm	this	in	their	cross-national	
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of	 social	 capital	 in	 the	 same	 way	 as	 Ostrom	 and	 Ahn.	 However,	 they	 found	 that	 political	
institutions	indeed	account	for	the	quantitative	level	of	interactions,	stating	that	“a	more	liberal	
regime	 leads	 to	more	networking”	 (2009,	 722)	while	 repressive	 state	 institutions	 inhibit	 the	
development	of	networks	(as	in	the	case	of	Uzbekistan	compared	to	Kyrgyzstan).	However,	it	is	
important	to	note	that	some	institutions	can	also	undermine	social	capital,	since	“institutions	
are	not	necessarily	or	even	usually	created	to	be	socially	efficient;	rather	 they,	or	at	 least	 the	
formal	rules,	are	created	to	serve	the	interests	of	those	with	the	bargaining	power	to	devise	new	
rules”	(North	1990,	16).
Bridging versus Bonding Social Capital
As	outlined	above,	much	of	the	literature	distinguishes	between	bonding	and	bridging	social	









trust	under	uncertainty,	 especially	 regarding	 the	 intention	of	others	 to	 cooperate.	The	 trust	
game	 served	 as	 game	 theoretical	 example	 showing	 that	 trust	 leads	 to	 collective	 action	with	
beneficial	outcomes.	In	areas	of	limited	statehood,	it	is	not	sufficient	for	actors	to	have	a	shared	
interest	in	coordinating	their	behavior	to	provide	public	goods.	Coordination	in	the	absence	





horizontal	 coordination	 takes	 place:	 levels	 of	 governance	 provision	 should	 be	 lower	 where	
horizontal	cooperation	cannot	draw	on	high	levels	of	bridging	social	capital.



























and	 disintegration	 somewhat	 reminiscent	 of	 an	 earlier	 time	 when	 political	
life	 involved	 confusing,	 overlapping,	 and	 conflicting	 demands	 on	 individual	
allegiances;	 and	 when	 polities	 were	 organized	 around	 emperors,	 kings,	 feudal	
lords,	 churches,	 chartered	 towns,	guilds,	 and	 families“	 (March	and	Olsen	1998,	
946).
This	environment	of	clustered	governance	often	includes	governance	actors	such	as	“warlords	
and	 their	militias	 in	 outlying	 regions,	 gang	 leaders	 in	 townships	 and	 squatter	 settlements,	






























„Over	 thousands	 of	 years,	 nevertheless,	 ordinary	 people	 have	 committed	 their	
major	energies	and	most	precious	resources	to	trust	networks	–	not	only	clandestine	





have	 often	 treated	 them	as	 obstacles	 to	 effective	 rule,	 yet	 have	never	 succeeded	
in	annihilating	 them	and	have	usually	worked	out	 accommodations	producing	
enough	resources	and	compliance	to	sustain	their	regimes“	(Tilly	2004,	6).


















institutions,	most	notably	 churches	or	other	 religious	 institutions,	play	 an	 important	 role	 in	
providing	basic	public	goods	such	as	health	and	education	in	hybrid	political	orders”	(2009,	19).
At	the	same	time,	networks	are	often	formed	around	common	beliefs	that	feed	into	norms	of	
solidarity	 and	 reciprocity	 among	members.	 Following	 the	 logic	 of	 appropriateness,	 trustees	
often	behave	in	a	trustworthy	way,	which	reinforces	trust	in	repetitive	interactions.	Not	all	of	





























malian	“clanustan,”	 actors	 cooperate	 to	provide	 the	 rule	of	 law	 (often	 through	Sharia	 courts	
founded	by	local	coalitions),	but	the	institutionalized	modes	of	governance	are	confined	to	the	






















Social	 capital,	 however,	 is	 often	 only	 available	 in	 defined	 groups	 where	 information	 about	
members’	 past	 opportunism	 is	 available	 and	 shared	 normative	 beliefs	 effectively	 regulate	
behavior	and	interaction.	Previous	conflicts	and	a	lacking	history	of	inter-group	cooperation	









Social	 capital	may	 also	 be	 detrimental	“because	 group	 solidarity	 in	 human	 communities	 is	
often	 purchased	 at	 the	 price	 of	 hostility	 towards	 out-group	members”	 (Fukuyama	 2001,	 8).	
Solidarity	 among	 gang	members	 does	 not	 necessarily	 contribute	 to	 the	 emergence	 of	 civil	
society	associations	that,	for	example,	monitor	state	actions	(cp.	Putnam	2000,	315-316).	Brinkley	




























































































Equifinality	“challenges	and	undermines	 the	common	assumption	 that	 similar	outcomes	 in	
several	cases	must	have	a	common	cause”	(George	and	Bennett	2005,	161).	Governance	in	areas	
of	 limited	 statehood	 is	 a	multivariate	phenomenon	 that	may	be	 facilitated	by	different	 suf-
ficient	but	not	necessary	conditions.	This	paper	has	presupposed	that	social	capital	can	be	a	
functional	equivalent	for	the	hierarchical	enforcement	of	rules	by	states	to	facilitate	collective	




























linking	 social	 capital	 to	 different	 types	 of	 non-state	 governance,	measuring	 the	 dependent	






statehood	 strongly	 influences	both	 security	delivery	 and	 the	quality	of	 security	
sector	 governance	 (see	 further	 Schneckener,	 2007)	…	 Since	 available	 indicators	
focus	primarily	on	 the	 characteristics	of	 state	 institutions	 and	actors,	however,	
the	 impact	 of	 private	 security	 actors	 on	 security	 sector	 governance	 remains	
inadequately	reflected	in	available	datasets“	(Schröder	2010,	31-2).
4.3 Policy Lessons for Institutional Transfers
Institutional	 transfers	 within	 international	 state-building	 endeavors	 have	 yielded	 mixed	
outcomes.	Despite	various	forms	of	“governance	without	the	state,”	there	is	no	feasible	alternative	
to	 state	 institutions,	 especially	 concerning	 inclusive	 democratic	 institutions.	Yet,	 the	mixed	
outcomes	suggest	that	transferring	institutions	depends	on	variables	that	have	not	sufficiently	




are	 no	 different,	 since	 they	 also	 depend	 on	particular	 social	 contexts	while	 generating	new	
kinds	of	social	capital.	This	argument	is	not	new	to	state-building	discourse	(see	e.g.	Chandler	







Corruption	 fostered	by	bonding	 social	 capital	 (Harris	 2007)	 is	 only	one	problem	 that	 arises	
in	this	context.	If	social	capital	endowments	are	not	clocked	with	transfer	outcomes,	 formal	
institutions	 have	 to	 be	 merged	 with	 other	 institutions	 sustained	 by	 certain	 social	 capital	




„The	 future	 of	 democracy,	 for	 example,	 depends	 on	 connections	 between	 trust	










Adler, Paul S./Kwon, Seok-Woo 2002:	Social	capital:	Prospects	for	a	New	Concept.	The	Academy	of	
Management	Review	27	(1):	17-40.
Ahn, T. K./Ostrom, Elinor 2008:	“Social	Capital	and	Collective	Action.”	In	The	Handbook	of	Social	
Capital,	eds.	Dario	Castiglione,	Jan	van	Deth	and	Guglielmo	Wolleb.	New	York:	Oxford	
University	Press.	70-100.




Arrow, Kenneth J. 1972:	Gifts	and	Exchanges.	Philosophy	&	Public	Affairs	1	(4):	343-362.
Axelrod, Robert 1981:	The	Emergence	of	Cooperation	among	Egoists.	The	American	Political	Sci-
ence	Review	75	(2):	306-318.










Boege, Volker/Brown, M. Anne/ Clements, Kevin P. 2009:	Hybrid	Political	Orders,	Not	Fragile	States.	
Peace	Review	21	(1):	13-21.





Börzel, Tanja A./Risse, Thomas 2010:	Governance	without	a	state:	Can	it	work?	Regulation	&	Gov-
ernance	4	(2):	113-134.
Bowles, Samuel/Gintis, Herbert 2002:	Social	Capital	And	Community	Governance.	The	Economic	
Journal	112	(483):	419-436.
Braithwaite, Valerie A./Levi, Margaret eds. 1998:	Trust	and	governance,	Russell	Sage	Foundation:	
Russell	Sage	Foundation	series	on	trust	1.	New	York:	Russell	Sage	Foundation.
Brinkerhoff, Derick W./Brinkerhoff, Jennifer M. 2002:	Governance	Reforms	and	Failed	States:	Chal-
lenges	and	Implications.	International	Review	of	Administrative	Sciences	68	(4):	511-531.
On the Social Conditions of Governance: Social Capital and Governance in Areas of Limited Statehood  |  48
Brinkerhoff, Derick W./Johnson, Ronald W. 2009:	Decentralized	local	governance	in	fragile	states:	
learning	from	Iraq.	International	Review	of	Administrative	Sciences	75	(4):	585-607.
Brinkerhoff, Derick W./Mayfield, James B. 2005:	Democratic	governance	in	Iraq?	Progress	and	peril	
in	reforming	state-society	relations.	Public	Administration	and	Development	25	(1):	59-
73.





















Coase, Ronald H. 1937:	The	Nature	of	the	Firm.	Economica	4	(16):	386-405.
Coleman, James Samuel 1990:	Foundations	of	social	theory.	Cambridge:	Harvard	University	Press.
Colletta, Nat J./Cullen, Michelle L. 2000:	Violent	Conflict	and	the	Transformation	of	Social	Capi-
tal	:	Lessons	from	Cambodia,	Rwanda,	Guatemala,	and	Somalia.	Washington,	D.C.:	The	
World	Bank.
Collier, Ruth B./Collier, David 1991:	Shaping	the	political	arena:	Critical	junctures,	the	labor	move-
ment,	and	regime	dynamics	in	Latin	America.	Princeton:	Princeton	University	Press.
Creed, W. E. Douglas/Miles, Raymond E. 1996:	“Trust	in	Organizations	:	A	Conceptual	Framework	
Linking	Organizational	 Forms,	Managerial	 Philosophies,	 and	 the	Opportunity	Costs	
of	Controls.”	In	Trust	in	organizations:	frontiers	of	theory	and	research,	eds.	Roderick	
Moreland	Kramer	and	Tom	R.	Tyler.	Thousand	Oaks	et	al.:	Sage.	16ff.
Debiel, Tobias/Glassner, Rainer/Schetter, Conrad/ Terlinden, Ulf 2009:	 Local	 State-Building	 in	Af-
ghanistan	and	Somaliland.	Peace	Review	21	(1):	38-44.




SFB-Governance Working Paper Series • No. 60 • September 2013  |  49
Draude, Anke 2007:	How	to	Capture	Non-Western	Forms	of	Governanc	:	In	Favour	of	an	Equiva-
lence	 Functionalist	Observation	 of	Governance	 in	Areas	 of	 Limited	 Statehood.	 SFB-
Governance	Working	Paper	Series	2.
Fearon, James D./David D. Laitin 1996:	Explaining	Interethnic	Cooperation.	The	American	Politi-
cal	Science	Review	90	(4):	715-735.





















George, Alexander L./Bennett, Andrew 2005:	Case	studies	and	theory	development	in	the	social	sci-
ences.	BCSIA	studies	in	international	security.	Cambridge:	MIT	Press.
Glaeser, Edward L./Laibson, David I./Scheinkman,José A./Soutter, Christine L. 2000:	Measuring	Trust.	
Quarterly	Journal	of	Economics	115	(3):	811-846.
Granovetter, Mark S. 1973:	The	Strength	of	Weak	Ties.	American	Journal	of	Sociology	78	(6):	1360-
1380.
--- 1983:	The	Strength	of	Weak	Ties:	A	Network	Theory	Revisited.	Sociological	Theory	I:	201-233.
Grimm, Sonja/Merkel, Wolfgang 2009:	“War	and	Democratization:	Legality,	Legitimacy	and	Effec-
tiveness.”	In	War	and	Democratization,	eds.	Wolfgang	Merkel	and	Sonja	Grimm.	New	
York:	Routledge.	1-15.
Grootaert, Christiaan, et al. 2004:	Measuring	social	capital:	an	 integrated	questionnaire	 (World	
Bank	Working	Paper).	Washington:	World	Bank.
Guiso, Luigi/Sapienza, Paola/Zingales, Luigi 2008:	Alfred	Marshall	lecture	–	Social	capital	as	good	
culture.	Journal	of	the	European	Economic	Association	6	(2-3):	295-320.
Güth, Werner/Kliemt, Hartmut 1998:	The	 indirect	 evolutionary	 approach:	 bridging	 the	gap	be-
tween	rationality	and	adaptation.	Rationality	and	Society	10	(3):	377-399.
Habermas, Jürgen 1992:	Moral	consciousness	and	communicative	action.	Studies	in	contempo-
On the Social Conditions of Governance: Social Capital and Governance in Areas of Limited Statehood  |  50
rary	German	social	thought.	Trans.	Christian	Lenhardt	and	Shierry	Weber	Nicholsen.	
Cambridge:	MIT	Press.







Harrison, Lawrence E./Huntington, Samuel P.  2000.	Culture	matters	 :	how	values	shape	human	
progress.	New	York:	Basic	Books.





Hooghe, Marc/Stolle, Dietlind eds. 2003:	Generating	Social	Capital:	Civil	Society	and	Institutions	in	
Comparative	Perspective.	New	York	and	Basingstoke:	Palgrave	Macmillan.







Inglehart, Ronald/Welzel, Christian 2005:	Modernization,	cultural	change,	and	democracy	:	the	hu-
man	development	sequence.	New	York:	Cambridge	University	Press.
Inkpen, Andrew C./Tsang, Eric W. K. 2005:	Social	Capital,	Networks,	and	Knowledge	Transfer.	The	
Academy	of	Management	Review	30	(1):	146-165.
Jackman, Robert W./Miller, Ross A. 1998:	Social	Capital	and	Politics.	Annual	Review	of	Political	
Science	1	(1):	47-73.
---2004.	Before	norms	 :	 institutions	 and	 civic	 culture.	Ann	Arbor,	Mich.:	Univ.	 of	Michigan	
Press.




Jensen, Erik G. 2008:	„Justice	and	the	Rule	of	Law.“	In	Building	states	to	build	peace,	eds.	Charles	
T.	Call	and	Vanessa	Wyeth.	Boulder	et	al.:	Rienner.	119-142.




SFB-Governance Working Paper Series • No. 60 • September 2013  |  51
Thomas	M.	Callaghy,	Ronald	Kassimir	and	Robert	Latham.	Cambridge	et	al.:	Cambridge	
University	Press.	93-112.
Knack, Stephen/Keefer, Philip 1997:	Does	Social	Capital	Have	An	Economic	Payoff?	A	Cross-Coun-
try	Investigation.	Quarterly	Journal	of	Economics	112	(4):	1251-1288.
Kötter, Matthias/Schuppert, Gunnar Folke eds. 2009:	Normative	Pluralität	ordnen.	Baden-Baden:	
Nomos.
Kramer, Roderick Moreland 1999:	Trust	 and	Distrust	 in	Organizations:	Emerging	Perspectives,	
Enduring	Questions.	Annual	Review	of	Psychology	50	(1):	569-598.
Kramer, Roderick Moreland/Tyler, Tom R. eds. 1996:	Trust	in	organizations:	frontiers	of	theory	and	
research.	Thousand	Oaks:	Sage.
Krasner, Stephen D. 1984:	Review:	Approaches	to	the	State:	Alternative	Conceptions	and	Historical	
Dynamics.	Comparative	Politics	16	(2):	223-246.
















Lipset, Seymour Martin 1959:	Some	Social	Requisites	of	Democracy:	Economic	Development	and	
Political	Legitimacy.	The	American	Political	Science	Review	53	(1):	69-105.












--- 2004:	 „Governance	 im	 modernen	 Staat.“	 In	 Governance	 –	 Regieren	 in	 komplexen	






Menkhaus, Kenneth 2008:	“Somalia:	Governance	vs.	Statebuilding.”	 In	Building	states	 to	build	
peace,	eds.	Charles	T.	Call	and	Vanessa	Wyeth.	Boulder	et	al.:	Rienner.	187-215.
Milgrom, Paul R./North, Douglass C./Weingast, Barry R. 1990:	The	Role	Of	Institutions	In	The	Re-
vival	Of	Trade:	The	Law	Merchant,	Private	Judges,	And	The	Champagne	Fairs.	Econom-
ics	&	Politics	2	(1):	1-23.
Misztal, Barbara A. 1996:	Trust	in	modern	societies:	the	search	for	the	bases	of	social	order.	Cam-
bridge:	Polity	Press.
Mitchell, James Clyde 1969:	“The	Concept	 and	Use	of	Social	Networks.”	 In	Social	networks	 in	
urban	situations:	analyses	of	personal	relationships	in	Central	African	towns,	ed.	James	
Clyde	Mitchell.	Manchester:	Manchester	University	Press.








tions,	 and	politics,	 eds.	Mariano	Torcal	 and	 José	R.	Montero.	London	and	New	York:	
Routledge.
North, Douglass C. 1990:	Institutions,	institutional	change	and	economic	performance.	Political	
economy	of	institutions	and	decisions.	Cambridge	et	al.:	Cambridge	University	Press.















--- 2000:	 Collective	 Action	 and	 the	 Evolution	 of	 Social	 Norms.	 The	 Journal	 of	 Economic	
SFB-Governance Working Paper Series • No. 60 • September 2013  |  53
Perspectives	14	(3):	137-158.
Ostrom, Elinor/Ahn,T. K. 2003:	Foundations	of	Social	Capital.	Critical	studies	in	economic	insti-
tutions	2.	Cheltenham	et	al.:	Elgar.






Parboteeah, K. Praveen./Cullen, John B./Lim, Lrong 2004:	 Formal	 volunteering:	A	 cross-national	
test.	Journal	of	World	Business	39	(4):	431-441.
Paris, Roland/Sisk, Timothy D. 2009:	The	dilemmas	of	statebuilding	:	confronting	the	contradic-








Powell, Walter W. 1990:	“Neither	Market	 nor	Hierarchy:	Network	 Forms	 of	Organization.”	 In	
Research	 in	Organizational	 Behaviour,	 eds.	 Barry	 Staw	 and	 Lawrence	 L.	 Cummings.	
Greenwich:	JAI	Press.	295-336.
Putnam, Robert D. 2000:	Bowling	alone:	the	collapse	and	revival	of	American	community.	New	
York:	Simon	&	Schuster.
Putnam, Robert D./Leonardi, Robert/Nanetti, Raffaella 1993:	Making	democracy	work:	civic	 tradi-
tions	in	modern	Italy.	Princeton,	N.J.:	Princeton	University	Press.
Pye, Lucian W./ Verba, Sidney 1965.	Political	culture	and	political	development.	Studies	in	political	
development.	Princeton:	Princeton	University	Press.














On the Social Conditions of Governance: Social Capital and Governance in Areas of Limited Statehood  |  54
American	Political	Science	Association,	Washington.
Risse, Thomas/Lehmkuhl, Ursula 2006:	Governance	in	areas	of	limited	statehood	–	new	modes	of	
governance.	SFB-Governance	Working	Paper	Series	1.
--- 2007	„Regieren	ohne	Staat?	Governance	in	Räumen	begrenzter	Staatlichkeit.“	In	Regieren	
ohne	 Staat?	Governance	 in	Räumen	begrenzter	 Staatlichkeit,	 eds.	Thomas	Risse	 and	
Ursula	Lehmkuhl.	Baden-Baden:	Nomos.	13-37.










Rothstein, Bo/Stolle, Dietlind 2008:	The	State	and	Social	Capital:	An	Institutional	Theory	of	Gen-
eralized	Trust.	Comparative	Politics	40	(4):	441-459.















Schröder, Ursula C. 2010:	Measuring	Security	Sector	Governance	–	A	Guide	to	Relevant	Indicators.	
Geneva:	Geneva	Centre	for	the	Democratic	Control	of	Armed	Forces	(DCAF).
Scott, James C. 1998:	Seeing	like	a	state	:	how	certain	schemes	to	improve	the	human	condition	
have	failed.	New	Haven	and	London:	Yale	University	Press.
Smidt, Corwin E., ed. 2003:	Religion	as	social	capital	:	producing	the	common	good.	Waco:	Baylor	
University	Press.























Tusalem, Rollin F. 2007:	A	Boon	or	a	Bane?	The	Role	of	Civil	Society	in	Third-	and	Fourth-Wave	
Democracies.	International	Political	Science	Review	28	(3):	361-386.




van Deth, Jan W. 2010:	“Political	Sociology:	Old	Concerns	and	New	Directions.”	In	Political	soci-
ology	-	the	state	of	the	art	:	the	world	of	political	science	-	the	state	of	the	discipline,	eds.	
Subrata	K.	Mitra,	Malte	Pehl	and	Clemens	Spiess.	Opladen	at	al.:	Budrich.















On the Social Conditions of Governance: Social Capital and Governance in Areas of Limited Statehood  |  56
Woolcock, Michael/Narayan, Deepa 2000:	 Social	Capital:	 Implications	 for	Development	Theory,	
Research,	and	Policy.	The	World	Bank	Research	Observer	15	(2):	225-249.
World Bank 2011:	 “Overview:	 Social	 Capital.”	 http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/
TOPICS/EXTSOCIALDEVELOPMENT/EXTTSOCIALCAPITAL/0,,contentMDK:20642
703~menuPK:401023~pagePK:148956~piPK:216618~theSitePK:401015,00.html	(Jan	2011).
World Values Survey Association 2009:	 “World	 Values	 Survey	 1981-2008	 Official	 Aggregate	
v.20090901.”	http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/	(Nov	2010).
Zakaria, Fareed 1997:	The	rise	of	illiberal	democracy.	Foreign	Affairs	76	(6):	22-43.
SFB-Governance Working Paper Series • No. 60 • September 2013  |  57
Previously published Working Papers from the SFB-Governance Working Paper Series
Kötter, Matthias 2013: Wie viel Recht steckt in Good Governance? Eine Betrachtung aus juristischer Perspektive, SFB-Gover-
nance Working Paper Series Nr. 58, DFG Sonderforschungsbereich 700, Berlin, September 2013
 Wrase, Michael 2013: Wie wirkt Recht? – Überlegungen zur Rechtswirkungsforschung unter den Bedingungen konsoli-
dierter und begrenzter Staatlichkeit, SFB-Governance Working Paper Series Nr. 57, DFG Sonderforschungsbe-
reich 700, Berlin, Juni 2013
van Hüllen, Vera/Börzel, Tanja A. 2013: The EU’s Governance Transfer. From External Promotion to Internal Protection?, 
SFBGovernance Working Paper Series, No. 56, Collaborative Research Center (SFB) 700, Berlin, June 2013.
Chojnacki, Sven/Engels, Bettina 2013: Material Determinism and Beyond: Spatial Categories in the Study of Violent Conflict, 
SFB-Governance Working Paper Series, No. 55, Collaborative Research Center (SFB) 700, Berlin, June 2013.
Bothe, Lukas/Grundmann, Kai 2013: Legitimitätsressourcen im Übergang von antiker zu mittelalterlicher Staatlichkeit. Zwei 
Perspektiven auf postimperiale Governance, SFB-Governance Working Paper Series Nr. 44, DFG Sonderfor-
schungsbereich 700, Berlin, Juni 2013
Böhnke, Jan/Koehler, Jan/Zürcher, Christoph 2013: Assessing the Impact of Development Cooperation in Northeast Afgha-
nistan: Approaches and Methods. SFB-Governance Working Paper Series, No. 43, Collaborative Research Center 
(SFB) 700, Berlin, February 2013.
Börzel, Tanja A./van Hüllen, Vera/Lohaus, Mathis 2013: Governance Transfer by Regional Organizations. Following a Global 
Script? SFB-Governance Working Paper Series, No. 42, Collaborative Research Center (SFB) 700, Berlin, January 
2013.
Goikhman, Izabella/Herrmann, Barbara 2012: The Governance Discourse in China. SFB-Governance Working Paper Series, 
No. 41, Collaborative Research Center (SFB) 700, Berlin, November 2012.
Willms, Jan 2012: Justice through Armed Groups’ Governance – An Oxymoron? SFB-Governance Working Paper Series, No. 
40, Collaborative Research Center (SFB) 700, Berlin, October 2012.
Ickler, Christian/Wiesel, John 2012: New Method, Different War? Evaluating Supervised Machine Learning by Coding Armed 
Conflict, SFB-Governance Working Paper Series, No. 39, Collaborative Research Center (SFB) 700, Berlin, Sep-
tember 2012.
Livingston, Steven/Walter-Drop, Gregor 2012: Information and Communication Technologies in Areas of Limited Statehood, 
SFB-Governance Working Paper Series, No. 38, Collaborative Research Center (SFB) 700, Berlin, September 2012.
Schüren, Verena 2012: Two TRIPs to Innovation. Pharmaceutical Innovation Systems in India and Brazil, SFB-Governance 
Working Paper Series, No. 37, Collaborative Research Center (SFB) 700, Berlin, June 2012.
On the Social Conditions of Governance: Social Capital and Governance in Areas of Limited Statehood  |  58
Sonderforschungsbereich 700: Grundbegriffe der Governanceforschung, SFB-Governance Working Paper Series, No. 36, 2. 
revised edition, Collaborative Research Center (SFB) 700, Berlin, June 2012.
Eimer, Thomas R. 2012: When Modern Science Meets Traditional Knowledge: A Multi-Level Process of Adaption and Resi-
stance, SFB-Governance Working Paper Series, No. 35, Collaborative Research Center (SFB) 700, Berlin, June 2012.
Kötter, Matthias 2012: Non-State Justice Institutions: A Matter of Fact and a Matter of Legislation, SFB-Governance Working 
Paper Series, No. 34, Collaborative Research Center (SFB) 700, Berlin, June 2012.
Koehler, Jan 2012: Social Order Within and Beyond the Shadows of Hierarchy. Governance-Patchworks in Afghanistan, SFB-
Governance Working Paper Series, No. 33, Collaborative Research Center (SFB) 700, Berlin, June 2012.
Risse, Thomas 2012: Governance Configurations in Areas of Limited Statehood. Actors, Modes, Institutions, and Resources, 
SFB-Governance Working Paper Series, No. 32, Collaborative Research Center (SFB) 700, Berlin, March 2012.
Hönke, Jana, with Thomas, Esther 2012: Governance for Whom? – Capturing the Inclusiveness and Unintended Effects of 
Governance, SFB-Governance Working Paper Series, No. 31, Collaborative Research Center (SFB) 700, Berlin, April 
2012.
Contreras Saíz, Mónika/Hölck, Lasse/Rinke, Stefan 2012: Appropriation and Resistance Mechanisms in (Post-) Colonial Con-
stellations of Actors: The Latin American Frontiers in the 18th and 19th Century, SFB-Governance Working Paper 
Series, No. 30, Collaborative Research Center (SFB) 700, Berlin, April 2012.
Börzel, Tanja 2012: How Much Statehood Does it Take – and What For?, SFB-Governance Working Paper Series, No. 29, Col-
laborative Research Center (SFB) 700, Berlin, March 2012.
Prigge, Judit 2012: Friedenswächter. Institutionen der Streitbeilegung bei den Amhara in Äthiopien, SFB-Governance Wor-
king Paper Series, No. 28, Collaborative Research Center (SFB) 700, Berlin, January 2012.
Jacob, Daniel/Ladwig, Bernd/Oldenbourg, Andreas 2012: Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors in Areas of Limited 
Statehood, SFB-Governance Working Paper Series, No. 27, Collaborative Research Center (SFB) 700, Berlin, Janu-
ary 2012.
Schmelzle, Cord 2011: Evaluating Governance. Effectiveness and Legitimacy in Areas of Limited Statehood, SFB-Governance 
Working Paper Series, No. 26, Collaborative Research Center (SFB) 700, Berlin, November 2011.
Börzel, Tanja A./Hönke, Jana 2011: From Compliance to Practice. Mining Companies and the Voluntary Principles on Security 
and Human Rights in the Democratic Republic of Congo, SFB-Governance Working Paper Series, No. 25, Colla-
borative Research Center (SFB) 700, Berlin, October 2011.
These publications can be downloaded from www.sfb-governance.de/publikationen or ordered in printed versions via 
e-mail to sfb700@zedat.fu-berlin.de.













Governance has become a central theme in social science 
research. The Collaborative Research Center (SFB) 700 Gov-
ernance in Areas of Limited Statehood investigates govern-
ance in areas of limited statehood, i.e. developing countries, 
failing and failed states, as well as, in historical perspective, 
different types of colonies. How and under what conditions 
can governance deliver legitimate authority, security, and 
welfare, and what problems are likely to emerge? Operating 
since 2006 and financed by the German Research Founda-
tion (DFG), the Research Center involves the Freie Univer-
sität Berlin, the University of Potsdam, the European Uni-
versity Institute, the Hertie School of Governance, the Ger-
man Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP), 
and the Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB). 




Hertie School of Governance
German Institute for International and 
Security Affairs (SWP)
Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB)
